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Abstract
At the minisuperspace level of homogeneous models, the bare probability
for a classical universe has a huge peak at small universes for the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ wavefunction, in contrast to the suppression at small
universes for the ‘tunneling’ wavefunction. If the probability distribution is
cut off at the Planck density (say), this suggests that the former quantum
state is inconsistent with our observations. For inhomogeneous models in
which stochastic inflation can occur, it is known that the idea of including a
volume factor in the observational probability distribution can lead to arbi-
trarily large universes’ being likely. Here this idea is shown to be sufficient
to save the Hartle-Hawking proposal even at the minisuperspace level (for
suitable inflaton potentials), by giving it enough space to be consistent with
observations.
Various remarkable features of our universe, not implied by the dynamical laws
that seem to govern its evolution, strongly suggest that its state is not random
but highly special. Examples of these special features are the large size and low
curvature of the present universe, the approximate homogeneity and isotropy of the
matter distribution on the largest scales that we can see today, and especially the
high degree of order in the early universe that has enabled entropy to increase, as
described by the second law of thermodynamics.
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Two leading proposals for special quantum states of the universe are the Hartle-
Hawking ‘no-boundary’ proposal [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] and the ‘tunneling’ proposal
of Vilenkin, Linde, and others [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. In toy models incorporating
presumed approximations for these proposals, they both seem to lead to low-entropy
early universes and so might explain the second law of thermodynamics. If a suitable
inflaton is present in the effective low-energy dynamical theory, and if sufficient infla-
tion occurs, both proposals seem to lead to approximate homogeneity and isotropy
today. However, it has been controversial whether both proposals do indeed predict
sufficient inflation for the large present size of the universe.
In particular, in the minisuperspace approximation of using only Robertson-
Walker geometries and a single homogeneous inflaton scalar field, the tree-level or
zero-loop probability densities for the two proposals have the opposite signs in the
exponent of the Euclidean action SE (itself inversely proportional to the inflaton
potential V (φ0) at the nucleation value φ0 of the inflaton field φ, when the nucleation
is via a Euclidean four-dimensional hemisphere):
PNB = e
−2SE = epia
2
0 = exp [
3
8V (φ0)
] (1)
for the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal, and
PT = e
−2|SE| = e+2SE = e−pia
2
0 = exp [− 3
8V (φ0)
] (2)
for the tunneling proposal, where
a0 = a0(φ0) = [8piV (φ0)/3]
−1/2, (3)
is the radius of the Euclidean four-dimensional hemisphere that is a solution of the
Einstein equations with an energy density V (φ0) that is the same in all frames (i.e.,
a stress-energy tensor Tµν = −V gµν), and where I am using Planck units throughout
(h¯ = c = G = 1). (If one thus distinguishes the tunneling proposal from the no-
boundary proposal by the sign of the exponent in the corresponding probability, then
by this particular criterion one should exclude [8, 9] as descriptions of the tunneling
proposal, since they gave the same sign of the exponent as the no-boundary proposal.
There can also be differences of opinion as to which of the remaining references refer
to the tunneling proposal, since they actually make slightly different proposals. For
this paper I shall refer to them all as the tunneling proposal, even though I am really
referring to a class of different proposals.)
During inflation the inflaton potential V (φ) decreases to some particular value
where inflation ends, so if one presumes that one has a realization of the universe
configuration in which the probability density is roughly maximized, then at this
level the tunneling proposal seems to favor the maximum amount of inflation possi-
ble, whereas the no-boundary proposal seems to favor the minimum amount. Typ-
ically the maximum amount of inflation is infinite (e.g., when the inflaton field in
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unbounded, or when the inflaton potential has a maximum), so in this regard the
tunneling proposal seems consistent with observations, which are themselves appar-
ently consistent with an arbitrarily large universe. However, the minimum amount
of inflation, just sufficient for it to be called inflation, is very small [14], leading to a
universe that would recollapse long before it got large enough to be consistent with
our observations of the universe.
One might conclude that the no-boundary proposal has thus been refuted by
observations. However, before rejecting it by such a simple-minded argument, one
should look for possible correction factors. Therefore, I shall describe various cor-
rections that have been proposed (though not in historical order).
One correction is the inclusion of higher-loop effects. At the one-loop level, it
has been shown [15] that there might be either an enhancement or a damping of
the probability density at very large inflaton potentials at the initial nucleation of
the universe as a quasi-classical entity. However, this seems grossly insufficient to
overcome the enormous exponentially large probability density of the no-boundary
proposal at unacceptably low values of the potential (leading to far too little in-
flation), at least if one restricts attention to one-loop effects where they are not
expected to be dominated by higher-loop effects (i.e., at densities below the Planck
value).
Furthermore, if the one-loop effects lead to a damping of the probability density,
this can make the tunneling proposal give the maximum probability density at an
initial value of the potential that is finite and leads to a finite amount of inflation. If
this finite amount is too small to fit the observations (which seem to require at least
about 60 or so e-folds of inflation [16, 17]), then the tunneling proposal, as well as the
no-boundary one, would seem to be in trouble. However, it is easy for the unknown
parameters entering the inflaton potential and the one-loop correction to be such
that even the finite amount of inflation thus predicted for the tunneling proposal
would be sufficient (typically much more than sufficient) to fit with observations
[15].
Thus one-loop effects, if they do not make the problem worse for both proposals,
seem to leave the no-boundary proposal at the same disadvantage it apparently has
relative to the tunneling proposal from the zero-loop calculation.
A second correction is to consider the total probability rather than just the
probability density. In other words, instead of simply asking where the peak of the
probability density is, one should, for each proposal, compare the total probability
for sufficient inflation with the total probability for insufficient inflation. Here is
the first consideration by which the no-boundary proposal might be as viable as the
tunneling proposal [18]. For although the unnormalized probability density of the
no-boundary proposal has an utterly enormous peak at tiny amounts of inflation,
one can easily see that if the nucleating value of the inflaton field is unbounded
above, and if loop or other effects do not damp the probability density at these
large values (where the zero-loop approximation has the probability density tending
to a constant, assuming that the potential either diverges or tends to a constant in
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this limit), then the integral of the probability density over this infinite range of the
value of the inflaton field gives a diverging unnormalized probability for sufficient
inflation. This swamps the exponentially large but finite unnormalized probability
for insufficient inflation, giving a prediction that the no-boundary proposal leads
to sufficient inflation (actually an arbitrarily large amount of inflation) with unit
normalized probability.
The usual objection to this argument for saving the no-boundary proposal is that
for it to work for an inflaton potential that rises indefinitely (and not unnaturally
slowly) for arbitrarily large values of the inflaton field, one must assume that the
probability density is not unduly damped for large values of the potential that greatly
exceed the Planck-density, which is roughly the largest density where the zero-loop
approximation might be expected to be rather reliable. It is sometimes said that one
should put a cutoff on the probability distribution at the Planck density, in which
case the integral over the probability density at lower values is grossly insufficient
to overbalance the huge peak at minimal values for inflation in the no-boundary
proposal.
The first part of this objection is indeed valid, that the total-probability solution
to the apparent difficulty of the no-boundary proposal does seem to require suitable
physics in the Planck regime, which we certainly do not yet understand. Thus this
solution is only a possible solution, not definitely a viable one.
On the other hand, the claim that the probability distribution should be cut off
at the Planck density is at least equally ad hoc and unjustified at present, so, just
as one cannot yet be sure that the total-probability solution does work, neither can
one be sure that it does not work. In other words, it is not definitely not viable.
A further argument against the total-probability solution for saving the no-
boundary proposal is the claim that one-loop effects do indeed damp the probability
density in a calculable way [15], so one does not simply have to invoke an ad hoc
cutoff at the Planck density. This may indeed be so for inflaton potentials below
the Planck density, but at the higher values of the inflaton field at nucleation, where
one needs to know the probability density, one would expect the one-loop effects
to be dominated by an infinite sequence of yet higher-loop effects that we do not
know how to calculate. (They are nonrenormalizable in ordinary Einsteinian grav-
ity.) Thus the one-loop calculations can give only a hint of what may occur and do
not tell the whole story necessary to determine whether or not the total-probability
argument saves the no-boundary proposal.
One case in which the total-probability argument definitely seems not to work is
the case in which the inflaton field has only a (not too large) finite range [19] (e.g.,
if its range is topologically S1 rather than R1) or has only a finite volume (e.g., as
is the case for certain moduli spaces [20]). If this could be proved to be the case for
the actual inflaton driving inflation, then either one would need to look for another
correction factor or else conclude that the no-boundary proposal is inconsistent with
observations (or at least with our observations’ being typical observations predicted
by the theory, which is usually the best one can do with a quantum theory).
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A third correction is the use of the selection principle called the weak anthropic
principle (perhaps somewhat misleadingly, since it is not meant to refer just to
mankind) [21], that what we observe about the universe is conditioned on where we
as observers exist within the universe. Here I will take the “where” to mean not only
where we are spatially within the universe (e.g., on a planet with density at least
29 orders of magnitude larger than the average density in a large neighborhood
containing us), and not only where we are temporally within the history of the
universe (e.g., at roughly 1061 Planck times after the beginning, which is very long
in Planck times but which may be very short compared with the total lifetime of
our region of the universe if a superabundant amount of inflation occurred), but also
where we are within the quantum state of the universe (e.g., where we are within
the probability distribution for different universe configurations).
One obvious use of the weak anthropic principle is the observation that the
minimal amount of inflation is not that which can barely be given the name inflation
(or lead to a quasi-classical universe [14]), but is rather that which can lead to
observers like us. If observers require stellar nucleosynthesis and/or heat from a
nearby star, which occurs for timescales around 1061 Planck times (at least for the
low energy dynamics of our component of the universe), then as observers we would
expect to be in a universe configuration in which this long history occurred, which
would give a larger minimal value of inflation.
However, this use of the weak anthropic principle is not sufficient by itself to save
the no-boundary proposal from refutation by observation. For even after restricting
attention to the locations within the quantum state of the universe where observers
can occur, we can still ask whether what we observe is typical of what the distribution
of observers within the theory do observe.
For example, suppose that for the sake of argument we assume what cannot yet
be confirmed or refuted by calculation, namely that the no-boundary probability
density for the nucleating value of the inflaton potential V (φ0) is indeed damped
or cut off above the Planck density, so that the integral of the probability density
in the homogeneous minisuperspace approximation is finite and is almost entirely
dominated by the exponentially large peak at values of the potential that give only
small amounts of inflation. Now the weak anthropic principle would imply that
nearly all of this peak occurs for universes that do not last long enough to have
observers, so what is relevant for observers is the part of the probability distribution
above some observer-required minimum of the nucleating inflaton value φ0 that is
significantly to the right of the main part of the peak. Here the probability density
is far lower than it is at the top of the peak, but it is still falling very rapidly
with increasing nucleating inflaton field (at least for typical forms of the inflaton
potential, such as a power law with a small coupling constant).
Thus if we cut off the probability distribution at values of the nucleating inflaton
field φ0 below the observer-required minimum, as well as above the field value that
gives the Planck density, the bulk of the probability integrated over values between
these two cutoffs would occur for values just slightly above the lower cutoff. These
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values of the inflaton field would lead to inflation just slightly more than sufficient to
give a universe that lasts long enough for observers. The bare minimum amount of
inflation would have the observers’ existence occurring near the end of a recollapsing
universe, just before it got too hot for them (assuming that they mainly required a
minimum age of the universe for star formation and/or nucleosynthesis). Then the
typical values of the the nucleating inflaton field would lead to observers’ existing
just slightly earlier in a recollapsing universe, clearly in conflict with our observation
that the universe is still expanding.
However, the weak anthropic principle (or any similar selection principle that
postulates that we are typical conscious beings, observers, or parts of a civilization)
is capable of saving the no-boundary proposal when one considers inhomogeneous
inflaton fluctuations and their back-reaction on the metric, a process called ‘stochas-
tic inflation,’ which can lead to a ‘self-reproducing universe’ with ‘eternal inflation’
that occurs for an indefinitely long time and hence makes the volume of the universe
arbitrarily large [9, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The idea is based on the observation that
typical observers or civilizations are more likely to occur in spaces of larger volume,
other factors being equal [23, 24, 16, 26, 27].
The basic idea of eternal inflation was present in the original picture of ‘old’
inflation by Guth [28], in which inflation occurs forever in the ‘false vacuum’ region
that grows indefinitely. In that model eternal inflation was a problem, because the
bubbles of ‘true vacuum’ that form were essentially empty inside (not suitable pre-
cursors of our part of the universe), and collisions between bubble walls were too
infrequent to percolate and lead to a thermalized and fairly homogeneous region
[29, 30]. This ‘graceful exit’ problem was cured by ‘new’ inflation [31, 32] (inflation
starting at or near a maximum of an inflaton potential), in which the inflaton po-
tential is sufficiently flat that the inflaton undergoes a ‘slow roll’ down it, leading
to a thermalized and fairly homogeneous region within each bubble at the end of
inflation. Steinhardt [33] noted that new inflation can lead to a ‘regenerative meta-
cosmology’ with new bubbles regenerated forever by inflation outside the bubbles
(as in Guth’s old inflation, except that in new inflation the bubbles are not empty
and so are possible precursors for our present region of the universe). Linde [34]
followed up this idea by suggesting that the universe might be in this stationary
‘self-reproducing’ state forever in the past as well as in the future, thus eliminating
the need for an initial singularity.
The first application of the inhomogeneous stochastic evolution of the inflaton
field to eternal inflation was made by Vilenkin [9] for new inflation, when he showed
that one could get an arbitrarily large amount of inflation even within a bubble
(which could encompass the entire universe in Vilenkin’s picture, as in that of Hawk-
ing and Moss [35]), and not just outside the bubbles as in previous analyses. After
Linde discovered the scenario of ‘chaotic inflation’ [36] (inflation from an inflaton
potential without a maximum, or in a region where there is no maximum), which
seems more realistic than new inflation, he discovered that it also leads to eternal
stochastic inflation and what he called a ‘self-regenerating universe’ [23, 16]. (Linde
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was actually the first to use the phrase ‘eternal inflation’ [23], and he has been the
leading researcher of it since that time [23, 16, 26].)
Eternal stochastic inflation occurs when the rms ‘stochastic’ change in the scalar
field from the freezing out of inhomogeneous modes during one Hubble time ∆t =
H−1,
δφ =
H
2pi
=
√
2V
3pi
, (4)
is greater than the slow-roll change of the field during that same time,
∆φ = −φ˙∆t = V
′
3H2
=
V ′
8piV
. (5)
This occurs when the stochastic inflation condition
V ′2 <
128pi
3
V 3, (6)
is satisfied [16].
As a result of both the stochastic and slow-roll changes in the inflaton field, in
some regions the field decreases, and in others it increases. Although the amount of
comoving volume in which the field decreases is greater than the amount in which
the field increases (because of the slow-roll change ∆φ, which is toward smaller
fields), the back-reaction of the inflaton potential on the metric causes the physical
volume to increase more in the regions in which the field increases. Therefore, when
one weights the regions by their physical volumes rather than by their comoving
volumes, the dominant behavior is for the inflaton field to increase. This process
allows the inflaton field to remain large for an arbitrarily long time, thereby leading
to an arbitrarily large amount of inflation [9, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The results of eternal
stochastic inflation are claimed to be independent of the initial conditions [26] (a
claim which seems to me implicitly to assume some strong restriction on the allowed
quantum states but which apparently allows both the no-boundary and tunneling
states).
Now the main point of the present paper is the conceptual or pedagogical point
that even at the crude level of using only the zero-loop homogeneous minisuperspace
approximation, the anthropic-principle idea of weighting by the physical volume can
save the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal from appearing inconsistent with our
observations of an expanding universe, at least for a wide range of inflaton potentials,
even if the probability distribution is damped or cut off at the Planck density.
To use Vilenkin’s language [27], suppose we start with what he calls the “princi-
ple of mediocrity,” that our civilization is average, “randomly picked in the metau-
niverse.” This leads to a probability distribution for various observed results that
is proportional not only to what I shall call the ‘bare’ probability distribution of
universe configurations having these results, but also to the number of civilizations
occurring within the corresponding configuration. (Note that what I am calling
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a universe configuration, Vilenkin calls a universe, and what I call the universe,
Vilenkin calls the metauniverse.)
The bare probability distribution is that given by the appropriate probability
interpretation for the correct quantum state of the universe that does not make
reference to conscious beings, observers, or civilizations. (This interpretation, or
even its existence, is not yet agreed upon, but perhaps it does exist and give a
probability density something like the absolute square of the wavefunction, or maybe
proportional to an appropriate Klein-Gordon flux in superspace). Then, with other
factors being equal, one would expect the number of civilizations to be proportional
to the volume of space at the time at which the civilizations occur. (I myself might
prefer [37] to focus on conscious perceptions rather than civilizations, and someone
else might prefer to focus on observers, but one would expect any of these to be
proportional to the volume of space, other conditions being the same.) The volume
of space at the time of the civilizations would itself be proportional to the volume
of space at the end of inflation (assuming that inflation occurred, and that there is
a fixed volume expansion factor between the end of inflation and the time of the
civilizations, as there would be for approximately k=0 Friedmann-Robertson-Walker
parts of the universe with the same density at the end of inflation, the same density
at the time of the civilizations, or the same post-inflation age then, and the same
equation of state at the intermediate densities).
Thus one would expect that the probability distribution for observed results to be
roughly proportional to the bare probability distribution for these results, multiplied
by the volume of space at the end of inflation in the universe configuration that has
these results. I shall call this product the ‘observational’ probability distribution.
(In some quantum theories, such as my own Sensible Quantum Mechanics [37],
the observational probability distribution may be the only probability distribution
given by the theory, and the bare probability distribution may be undefined, but if
this is so, I can still employ in this paper the useful fiction that the observational
probability distribution factorizes into a product of a bare probability distribution
for some physical configuration or history, and of a probability or measure of how
much of certain types of observations occur within that configuration or history.
Also, as in Sensible Quantum Mechanics and in other variations of the many-worlds
formulation [38], the probability distribution may actually be a measure distribution
on an actual ensemble predicted by the theory, rather than any description of a
random choice, not precisely determined by the theory, of a single actual result out
of a hypothetical ensemble of possible results, as in versions of quantum mechanics
in which the quantum state is occasionally supposed to collapse in some particular
way not uniquely specified by the theory.)
Here I shall focus on the probability distribution, in the minisuperspace ap-
proximation, of one ‘constant of motion,’ φ0, of an approximate classical universe
model that matches a universe configuration. (The probability distribution of φ0
in stochastic inflation has been studied in [26].) In particular, I shall focus on uni-
verse configurations in which the effective constants of nature are the same as in our
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configuration and in which the large-scale configuration is approximately that of a
classical k = 1 Friedmann-Robertson-Walker universe which evolved from a period
of single inflation starting with a moment of time symmetry at which the size of the
universe was a minimum and the inflaton field had the homogeneous value φ0.
According to the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary proposal in the minisuperspace
approximation being used here, the zero-loop approximation for the bare probability
distribution gives the unnormalized approximate probability density of Eq. (1) for
φ0, but with PNB there replaced by Pbare here to emphasize that it is the approximate
bare probability, namely,
Pbare(φ0)dφ0 = e
pia20(φ0)dφ0 = exp [
3
8V (φ0)
]dφ0. (7)
(By “approximate,” I mean, e.g., ignoring multi-loop effects, Jacobians, or other
prefactors of the exponential of twice the negative of the real part of the Euclidean
action. I also mean that this Euclidean action is itself given here only in the ap-
proximation that variations in the potential and in the energy density are negligible
during a Euclidean regime that is assumed to be a Friedmann-Robertson-Walker 4-
dimensional hemisphere of radius a0 given by Eq. (3), bounded by a totally-geodesic
round equatorial 3-sphere that is the 3-space of the universe at its moment of nu-
cleation out of the Euclidean regime and into the Lorentzian regime of inflation.)
As noted above, the bare probability rises sharply for smaller values of V (φ0)
when this is much smaller than unity (the Planck density). However, we need to
multiply the bare probability by the volume of space at the end of inflation to get
the observational probability.
The volume of 3-space at the moment of nucleation, which is the beginning of a
Lorentzian period of inflation that would have had a moment of time symmetry then
if the Lorentzian evolution were analytically continued backward as well as forward
in real Lorentzian time from this moment of nucleation, is
V0 = 2pi2a30 = [
27pi
128V 3(φ0)
]1/2. (8)
Then we need to multiply by the volume expansion factor during inflation. Let
us assume that the inflaton potential has 0 < V ′(φ) ≡ dV/dφ << V (φ) << 1 for
φe << φ << φPl, with φe being the value of φ where
V ′(φe) = V (φe) (9)
(which will be taken to be the point at which inflation ends, since this is roughly
the point at which the slow-roll approximation breaks down), and with φPl being
the value of the inflaton field that leads to a potential of the Planck density,
V (φPl) = 1 (10)
in the Planck units I am using. Such a potential leads to slow-roll inflation for φ
in this range (which is assumed to include φ0). For simplicity, use the slow-roll
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approximation all the way to the end of inflation at φ = φe. Then the slow-roll
approximations to the FRW-inflaton equations lead to a volume expansion factor
during inflation of roughly
Ve
V0
= (
ae
a0
)3 = exp [24pi
∫ φ0
φe
V (φ)dφ
V ′(φ)
] = exp [12pi
∫ φe
φ0
a(φ)dφ
a′(φ)
]. (11)
Multiplying this volume expansion factor by the volume of space at the begin-
ning of inflation and by the bare probability distribution gives the unnormalized
observational probability distribution
Pobs(φ0)dφ0 = VePbare(φ0)dφ0
= V0(
ae
a0
)3Pbare(φ0)dφ0
= [
27pi
128V 3(φ0)
]1/2 exp [24pi
∫ φ0
φe
V (φ)dφ
V ′(φ)
] exp [
3
8V (φ0)
]dφ0
= 2pi2a30(φ0) exp [12pi
∫ φe
φ0
a(φ)dφ
a′(φ)
] exp [pia20(φ0)] = e
p(φ0)dφ0, (12)
where the logarithm of the unnormalized observational probability density is
p(φ0) = 24pi
∫ φ0
φe
V (φ0)dφ
V ′(φ0)
+
3
8V (φ0)
− 3
2
lnV (φ0) +
1
2
ln (
27pi
128
)
= 12pi
∫ φe
φ0
a0(φ)dφ
a′0(φ)
+ pia20(φ0) + 3 ln a0(φ0) + ln (2pi
2)
≈ 24pi
∫ φ0
φe
V (φ0)dφ
V ′(φ0)
+
3
8V (φ0)
= 12pi
∫ φe
φ0
a0(φ)dφ
a′0(φ)
+ pia20(φ0). (13)
I shall generally use one of these last two approximate expressions, dropping the
logarithm of the volume at the beginning of inflation as a relatively unimportant
term, and keeping only the logarithm of the volume expansion factor during infla-
tion and minus twice the Euclidean action in the zero-loop approximation to the
bare probability, since those two terms generally dominate when V (φ0) << 1, or,
equivalently, when a0(φ0) >> 1 (nucleating universe much larger than the Planck
size).
Now we need to put in the fact that the observational probability density is cut
off for φ0 < φm, where φm is the minimum value of the nucleating inflaton field to
lead to enough inflation for the existence of civilizations. If civilizations can only
occur when the universe is old enough for some nucleosynthesizing stars to have
burned out and yet for other heat-producing stars to still be burning, then if the
constants of nature take the values that they do in our universe configuration, one
would need at least Nm (roughly 60 [16, 17]) e-folds of inflation, and this makes φm
the solution of the following equation:
Nm = 8pi
∫ φm
φe
V (φ)dφ
V ′(φ)
. (14)
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If, for the sake of argument, we also cut off the probability distribution for
φ0 > φM (e.g., with φM = φPl), then unless φM is utterly enormous (which would
require that V (φ) be extremely flat at large φ if V (φM) ≤ 1), then most of the
total (integrated) observational probability for φm < φ0 < φM will occur near the
maximum of the approximate unnormalized observational probability density, or of
its logarithm p(φ0). If the maximum is at or very near φm, then one would predict
that a typical civilization would see the universe recollapsing, which is contrary to
our observations. But if the maximum is at a sufficiently higher value of φ0, there
would be enough inflation that the universe today would be much larger than what
we can see and hence very nearly spatially flat on a scale corresponding to its present
age (under the assumption that it is approximately Friedmann-Robertson-Walker),
thus agreeing with observations.
Now the analysis depends on the qualitative form of the inflaton potential V (φ).
Because a period of slow-roll inflation has V (φ) monotonically decreasing with time
while φ itself also changes monotonically, I shall assume that within the entire range
φm < φ < φM, V
′(φ) is bounded away from zero and hence has a single sign (which
without loss of generality is herein taken to be positive, since one could replace φ
by −φ if necessary). I shall also assume that V (φ) is sufficiently smooth to be at
least twice differentiable as a function of φ.
The first two derivatives of the approximate expression for the logarithm of the
probability density, p(φ0), then have the form
p′ ≡ dp
dφ0
=
24piV
V ′
− 3V
′
8V 2
= 2pia0(a
′
0 −
6
a′0
), (15)
p′′ ≡ d
2p
dφ20
= 24pi(1− V V
′′
V ′2
)− 3
8
(
V ′′
V 2
− 2V
′2
V 3
)
= 2pi[a0(1 +
6
a′20
)a′′0 + a
′2
0 − 6]
= 2pia0(1 +
6
a′20
)a′′0 +
a′0
a0
p′, (16)
where the primes on the V ’s and a0’s, just as on the p’s, mean derivatives with
respect to the φ0 independent variable, of which they are functions.
For a fairly general class of potentials V (φ0), which I shall call Class 1, p(φ0) has
no local maximum between φm and φM. For example, at a local extremum of p, one
can see from Eqs. (15) and (16) that the second derivative of p with respect to φ0
has the same sign as the second derivative of a0 or of V
−1/2, so if these functions
are concave upward (as they are, for example, if V is a positive power of φ0 or is
exponentially increasing with φ0), then p(φ0) has no local maximum.
Within this Class 1, the maximum of p(φ0) occurs at one of the endpoints, at
φm or φM, and so it is simply a question of whether p(φm) or p(φM) is larger, as-
suming that the difference is greater than the generally less-important factors we
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have dropped. If p(φm) is the larger, then the observational probability for the
Hartle-Hawking proposal (at least within the minisuperspace and zero-loop approx-
imations) would be dominated by cases in which observers occurred almost entirely
very late within a recollapsing universe, which is contrary to observations. But if
p(φM) is the larger, then the observational probability would be dominated by cases
in which the universe is expanding near the k = 0 borderline when observers occur
within it, which is consistent with our observations.
For the complementary class, which I shall call Class 2, p(φ0) does have one or
more local maxima between φm and φM, where a
′
0 = −
√
6 and a′′0 < 0. In this
case one needs to compare the values of p(φ0) at these local maxima as well as at
the endpoints, φm and φM. Still assuming that ignored factors are insignificant,
and assuming that no local maximum occurs so close to φm that it would give
insufficient inflation to be consistent with observations, the only case in which the
Hartle-Hawking proposal would apparently (i.e., if our approximations are valid) give
typical results inconsistent with our observations of the expansion of the universe
would be the case in which p(φm) is larger than the value of p(φ0) at the other
endpoint or any of the local maxima in between.
One sufficient (but not necessary) condition for p(φm) not to be the global max-
imum of p(φ0) for φm < φ0 < φM, and hence for the Hartle-Hawking proposal to
be consistent with our observations of the expansion of the universe (assuming, as
always, that other corrections factors are negligible), is that p′(φm) > 0. In terms of
the potential V and its derivative V ′, the sufficient condition for the Hartle-Hawking
proposal to pass this test is
V ′2 < 64piV 3, (17)
when evaluated at φ0 = φm. Or, in terms of the derivative a
′
0 (still with respect to
φ0) of a0 = (8piV/3)
−1/2 at φ0 = φm, it is
−
√
6 < a′0 < 0. (18)
On the other hand, for p(φ0) to be greater than p(φm) for some larger value of
φ0, one has the necessary condition that Eq. (17) or (18) be true when evaluated in
at least some range of φ0 greater than φm.
Consider the Class 1 example of a power-law potential with positive (constant)
exponent n,
V (φ) =
λ
n
φn, (19)
where λ is a coupling constant for the field, which in the Planck units we are using
is a number that shall be assumed to be small. (For example, for n = 2, it is the
square of the mass of the inflaton field φ, which is then a free massive field, minimally
coupled to gravity.)
Again making the approximation of keeping only the volume expansion factor
and the zero-loop bare probability factor, this leads to the logarithm of the obser-
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vational probability density varying roughly as
p(φ0) = p(φm) +
12pi
n
(φ20 − φ2m)−
3n
8λ
(φ−nm − φ−n0 ). (20)
For φ0 >> φm, one gets, roughly,
p(φ0)− p(φm) =
12pi
n
φ20 −
3n
8λφnm
. (21)
Since there are are no local maxima of p(φ0) for this Class 1 potential, it would
allow the Hartle-Hawking proposal (in the minisuperspace approximation under
consideration) to be consistent with observations if and only if p(φM) > p(φm),
or, roughly,
φ2M >
n2
32piλφnm
. (22)
To express this condition as a condition on the coupling constant λ for a given
exponent n, we need to write φM and φm in terms of these two parameters of the
potential. If one takes φM = φPl, the value where V = 1, one gets
φM = φPl = (
n
λ
)
1
n . (23)
Furthermore, φm is determined by the need for Nm (roughly 60 [16, 17]) e-folds
of inflation before φ decreases to φe, where the slow-roll approximation ends and
inflation ends. For the power-law potential given by Eq. (19), Eq. (10) gives
φe = n, (24)
and then for Nm e-folds of inflation, we need
Nm = ln (ae/a0) =
4pi
n
(φ2m − φ2e), (25)
so
φm =
√
φ2e +
nNm
4pi
=
√
n2 +
nNm
4pi
≈ (nNm
4pi
)1/2 ∼ 2√n, (26)
where the first approximation is for n << Nm/4pi, and the second [16] uses the fact
that Nm/4pi ∼ 4. (The fact that this number is not very large suggests that even the
first approximation is not very good, but in a more careful analysis [16] the slow-roll
approximation breaks down at a φe that is actually something like n/
√
16pi, which
would make the first term inside the square root of Eq.(26) about 50 times smaller
than the crude estimate above.)
Now if one inserts φM from Eq. (23) and the last approximation for φm from Eq.
(26) into the inequality (22), one finds that it becomes
λ
n−2
n > 2
−n(n+5)
2 pi−
n
2 n−(
n−2
2
)2 , (27)
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the condition for the Hartle-Hawking proposal (in the minisuperspace and zero-loop
approximations) to have most observers see a nearly flat universe, consistent with
our observations, rather than a recollapsing universe, for the power-law potential
(19).
We have already assumed that φm << φM, which implies that the coupling
constant must be small,
λ << 2−nn
2−n
n , (28)
so the inequality (27) is automatically true for n ≤ 2 (recall that we are assuming
that n > 0). In particular, for a free massive inflaton (n = 2), with mass much less
than the Planck mass, the Hartle-Hawking proposal (even at the minisuperspace
level being considered) would be consistent with our observations in predicting that
a typical observer would see a nearly flat universe on large scales.
However, for exponents n > 2, the consistency of the Hartle-Hawking proposal
is not automatic at this minisuperspace level. There is always a range of values of
the coupling constant λ that is consistent with both inequalities (27) and (28), but
for sufficiently large values of n, the allowed range for λ is at values too large to
be consistent with the observed density fluctuations of the universe (which one can
calculate only by going outside the minisuperspace approximation, at least for the
fluctuations).
For example, one may use the approximate expression Linde [16] gives (on p. 185)
for the coupling constant of a power-law potential from the density fluctuations of
the universe,
λ ∼ 2.5 · 10−13n2(4n)−n/2. (29)
Then one can readily calculate, using the approximations above,
p(φ0)− p(φm) ≈ 12pi
n
φ2M −
3n
8λφnm
∼ 48pi(4 · 10
12
n
)
2
n − 3
8
(
4 · 1012
n
), (30)
and this last expression is positive if and only if
n < 2.5430075348. (31)
Of course, the crudeness of the approximations above do not justify the precision
given here for the value of n at which the last expression of Eq. (30) vanishes; it
merely suggests that for n greater than roughly 5/2, the minisuperspace and zero-
loop approximations seem to make the Hartle-Hawking proposal be in conflict with
observations if one cuts off the distribution of nucleating universes at the Planck
density. Such a conflict does not occur for any power-law potential with a suitably
small coupling constant λ if one goes beyond the minisuperspace approximation to
eternal stochastic inflation [26].
Thus we see that for a power-law potential, when one includes the volume factor
in the distribution of observers (or of civilizations, or simply of conscious beings), the
minisuperspace and zero-loop approximations for the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary
14
proposal give results consistent with our observations of a universe expanding near
the critical density, even when an ad hoc cutoff is imposed on the minisuperspace
toy model at the Planck density, if the exponent of the power-law is smaller than
roughly 2.5. This includes the simple case of a free massive field but excludes the
case of a quartic potential (though the latter is allowed in inhomogeneous models
giving eternal stochastic inflation [26]).
Of course, there are other forms of the potential that would also make the Hartle-
Hawking proposal consistent with observations by the approximations above. These
include the cases in which the potential has a smooth maximum (below the Planck
density) at some finite field value, and the case in which the potential continues
to rise for arbitrarily large field values but asymptotically approaches a finite limit
(also assumed to be below the Plank density so that no cutoff need be made).
In both of these cases, one can get an arbitrarily large volume by having the
field nucleate arbitrarily near the maximum of the potential in the first case, or at
an arbitrarily large field value in the second case. Then the slow-roll approximation
will give an arbitrarily large amount of inflation, so the volume factor can become
arbitrarily large and hence dominate over any large (but necessarily finite) peak in
the bare probability distribution. (For this peak to be finite, I am assuming that the
cosmological constant is zero or positive, so that the potential is bounded below by
zero, and that inflation occurs only when the potential has a positive value, strictly
bounded away from zero.)
It is interesting that the inequality (17) is the same (up to a small change in the
coefficient that is not important at the level of the approximations being employed
here) as the inequality (6) that occurs for some range within an inflaton potential
allowing eternal inflation. Therefore, when the Hartle-Hawking approximation in
the minisuperspace approximation is consistent with our observations of an expand-
ing universe, then at the level of considering inhomogeneous fluctuations, it leads to
stochastic inflation and a large expanding universe also consistent with such obser-
vations. However, the converse is not true, since potentials obeying the inequality
(6) somewhere within the allowed range, and leading to stochastic inflation within
this range, need not in the minisuperspace approximation necessarily have the peak
in the observational probability distribution be at a nucleating inflaton value φ0 that
is higher than the minimum value φm. (The inequality (6) merely implies that the
observational probability density is rising with φ0 there, but not that it is necessarily
higher there than it is at φm.)
In particular, for any power-law potential (19) with a small coupling constant λ,
the inequality (6) is true for [16]
φ > (
3n3
128piλ
)
1
n+2 (32)
(which is a value below φPl and hence within the allowed range if φM ≥ φPl). Thus
stochastic inflation can occur for any power-law potential (with a positive exponent
and a sufficiently small coupling constant), giving a Hartle-Hawking state consistent
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with our observations of a large expanding universe, even though the misuperspace
approximation, for exponents n greater than about 2.5, would suggest that the
state would give typical observations of a recollapsing universe, if one cut off the
probability distribution at the Planck density V (φPl) = 1.
In summary, when one includes the volume of space in converting from bare
probabilities to observational probabilities, then the Hartle-Hawking no-boundary
proposal for the quantum state of the universe, as well as the tunneling proposal,
both seem to have enough space to be consistent with our observations of a nearly flat
expanding universe (rather than a contracting universe), at least for a wide class of
inflaton potentials that obey the inequality (6) somewhere within the allowed range
of the inflaton field, even if one cuts off the probability distribution for universes
nucleating above the Planck density. This fact has been known to be the case for
eternal stochastic inflation [25, 26], and here the pedagogical point is made that
the consistency of both proposals with the aforementioned observations occurs even
within the minisuperspace approximation for a certain subset of the potentials that
allow eternal inflation (e.g., for a massive scalar field, though not for a quartic
potential, despite the fact that the latter does allow eternal stochastic inflation,
and hence consistency with observations in the realistic case in which one allows
inhomogeneous metrics).
Therefore, when one tests theories of quantum cosmology against our observa-
tions of a large expanding universe, there is often space for both the no-boundary and
the tunneling proposals, even within the zero-loop minisuperspace approximation.
On the other hand, there are inflaton potentials (such as the power-law poten-
tials with exponents larger than roughly 2.5) that would make the Hartle-Hawking
no-boundary proposal, at the zero-loop minisuperspace level with the probability
distribution for nucleating universes cut off at the Planck density, appear to be in-
consistent with our observations of an expanding universe, even though a calculation
invoking eternal stochastic inflation would show that it is actually consistent.
One might ask whether it is the zero-loop or the minisuperspace approximation
(or both) that in these cases makes such a large difference from eternal stochastic
inflation. I would conjecture that although stochastic inflation requires one to go be-
yond the homogeneous minisuperspace approximation, it may not require one to go
beyond the zero-loop approximation. Very preliminary evidence suggests to me that
one should be able to get something like stochastic inflation simply be considering in-
homogeneous complex classical solutions of the Einstein-matter field equations that
obey the no-boundary conditions (when these conditions are expressed as analytic
equations that may be satisfied by complex solutions). In the zero-loop approxima-
tion, the bare probabilities would then be given simply by the exponential of minus
twice the real part of the Euclidean action (the imaginary part of the Lorentzian
action), but then to get the observational probabilities one would need to multiply
by the volume of space on hypersurfaces where the local conditions are suitable for
civilizations, observers, or conscious beings. Further details of this will be left for
another paper [39].
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I am less certain how to apply the tunneling conditions to inhomogeneous com-
plex classical solutions to get a zero-loop approximation for that proposal, but if
one can do it, I would expect that the results for large universes would be virtually
the same as for the no-boundary proposal. As stated in [26], ”the indefinitely large
growth of volume produced by inflation does solve the problem of initial conditions
for every theory where the self-reproduction of the universe is possible.”
I should also point out that I do not believe that the results would be indis-
tinguishable for all quantum states of the universe, but only those that lead to
self-reproduction with separate Hubble-sized regions being sufficiently uncorrelated.
Although this restriction would allow a large class of quantum states that lead to
eternal stochastic inflation and perhaps locally indistinguishable observations in typ-
ical post-inflation epochs where life may occur, it would presumably exclude an even
larger class of quantum states.
An analogy in nongravitational quantum field theory in classical Minkowski
spacetime would be the set of suitably nonpathological Fock states in which the
excitations disperse with time, so that in each local spatial region, the quantum
state asymptotically approaches that of the vacuum. There is a large class of such
QFT states, but they are a restrictive set of measure zero compared to a more
general class of states that never asymptotically approach the vacuum in any local
spatial regions (e.g., perturbations of thermal states at any nonzero temperature, a
real parameter that can have a continuum of values).
Therefore, even if it turns out that our observations cannot distinguish between
the no-boundary proposal, the tunneling proposal, and perhaps any other among
a certain large class of proposals, the remarkable order that we observe strongly
suggests to me that the quantum state of the universe is highly special. It is tempting
to speculate that it might be extremely simple. The no-boundary and tunneling
proposals are sketches for two very simple quantum states. Although for the goal of
discovering the precise quantum state of the universe, it is discouraging that both of
these proposals seem (at least so far) to predict indistinguishable observations, it is
encouraging that (again, at least so far as we now know) both seem to be consistent
with our observations.
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